

























such	rapid	succession	that	we	seem	to	perceive	them	all	at	a	single	glance.”	This	idea	is	consistent	with	 several	 lines	 of	 findings.	 Lack	 of	 or	 diminished	 holistic	 processing	 has	 been	 found	 in	individuals	with	poor	 face	recognition,	 such	as	acquired	and	developmental	prosopagnosics	(Busigny,	 Joubert,	 Felician,	 Ceccaldi,	&	Rossion,	 2010;	Palermo	et	 al.,	 2011;	DeGutis,	 Cohan,	Mercado,	 Wilmer,	 &	 Nakayama,	 2012)	 and	 individuals	 with	 autism	 spectrum	 disorders	(Hobson,	 Ouston,	 &	 Lee,	 1988;	 Joseph	 &	 Tanaka,	 2003),	 suggesting	 holistic	 processing	 is	 a	necessary	hallmark	of	normal	face	recognition.	Reduced	holistic	processing	can	also	be	related	to	worse	recognition	of	subpopulations	of	faces	with	which	one	has	less	experience,	such	as	faces	from	other	race,	ethnic,	or	age	groups	(Susilo,	Crookes,	McKone,	&	Turner,	2009;	Michel,	Rossion,	Han,	Chung,	&	Caldara,	2006;	but	see	Hayward,	Crookes,	&	Rhodes,	2013).	Moreover,	neural	 responses	 that	 are	 selective	 for	 faces	 as	 a	 whole	 have	 been	 identified	 by	electrophysiology	(Desimone,	Albright,	Gross,	&	Bruce,	1984)	and	neuroimaging	(Kanwisher,	McDermott,	 &	 Chun,	 1997;	 Liu,	 Harris,	 &	 Kanwisher,	 2010;	 Schlitz	 &	 Rossion,	 2006).	Significantly,	 the	presence	of	 the	upright	whole	 face	 influenced	the	tuning	of	neurons	 in	the	macaque	middle	face	patch	to	individual	face	features	(Freiwald,	Tsao,	&	Livingstone,	2009).		 Three	experimental	paradigms	have	come	to	be	widely	regarded	as	standard	measures	of	 holistic	 processing,	 as	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 1.	 One	 is	 the	 inversion	 task,	 in	which	 turning	stimuli	upside-down	impairs	 face	recognition	more	than	object	recognition	(Yin,	1969).	The	disproportionate	 inversion	 cost	 for	 faces	 presumably	 arise	 because	while	 upright	 faces	 are	perceived	holistically,	inverted	faces	rely	on	piecemeal	processing.	Another	is	the	part-whole	
task,	in	which	perception	of	a	face	part	such	as	eyes	is	more	accurate	when	that	part	is	shown	within	an	upright	face	than	when	it	is	presented	alone	(Tanaka	&	Farah,	1993).	This	effect	was	interpreted	 to	 indicate	 that	 face	 parts	 are	 encoded	 not	 in	 isolation	 but	 rather	 as	 integral	
 4 elements	of	a	larger	visual	unit	that	is	an	upright	face.	The	third	experimental	paradigm	is	the	
composite	task,	in	which	perception	of	the	top-half	of	an	upright	face	is	influenced	by	a	perfectly	aligned	 bottom-half	 even	 when	 participants	 are	 told	 to	 disregard	 the	 bottom-half.	 The	perception	of	the	top	half	is	dramatically	less	affected	by	the	bottom	half	when	the	halves	are	misaligned	breaking	the	wholeness	of	the	face	(Young,	Hellawell,	&	Hay,	1987),	or	when	the	two	halves	are	aligned	but	presented	upside-down	(Susilo,	Rezlescu,	&	Duchaine,	2013).	The	composite	effect	was	proposed	to	show	that	the	two	face	halves	are	automatically	integrated	when	they	are	aligned	to	fit	an	upright	face	template.		 There	 are	 two	 widely	 shared	 (and	 far-reaching)	 assumptions	 permeating	 research	related	to	the	inversion,	composite	and	part-whole	effects.	The	first	assumption	is	that	these	effects	measure	 the	 same	holistic	processes.	 Several	 findings	 showing	 that	 the	 three	 effects	associate	 across	 experimental	 manipulations	 seem	 to	 support	 this	 view.	 The	 inversion,	composite	and	part-whole	effects	are	greatly	reduced	or	abolished	for	a	wide	range	of	non-face	objects	and	other	 control	 stimuli,	 thus	dissociating	 face	 recognition	 from	object	 recognition	more	generally	(McKone	&	Robbins,	2011).	Furthermore,	all	these	effects	are	found	in	young	children,	with	adult-like	sizes	at	 the	youngest	age	tested	–	between	three	and	five	years	old	(McKone,	Crookes,	Jeffery,	&	Dilks,	2012).	That	inversion,	part-whole,	and	composite	effects	are	widely	assumed	to	tap	the	same	holistic	processes	are	evident	in	many	review	articles	on	face	perception	 (Duchaine	 &	 Yovel,	 2008,	 McKone,	 Kanwisher,	 &	 Duchaine,	 2007;	 Piepers	 &	Robbins,	2012;	Rhodes,	2013;	Tanaka	&	Gordon;	2011),	yet	this	assumption	is	seldom	tested	(DeGutis,	Wilmer,	Mercado,	&	Cohan,	2013,	Wang,	Fang,	Tian,	&	Liu,	2012).			 The	 second	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 inversion,	 part-whole	 and	 composite	 effects,	 as	putative	measures	of	holistic	processing,	are	related	to	face	recognition	ability,	in	that	larger	effects	(i.e.	stronger	holistic	processing)	are	associated	with	better	face	recognition.	This	notion	is	consistent	with	findings	that	inversion,	part-whole,	and	composite	effects	can	be	abolished	or	reduced	in	individuals	with	impaired	face	recognition	(Busigny	et	al.,	2010;	Palermo	et	al.,	2011;	 DeGutis	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Ramon,	 Busigny,	 &	 Rossion,	 2010).	 However,	 the	 relationship	between	holistic	processing	and	face	recognition	ability1	in	the	normal	range	remains	unclear	(DeGutis	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 Konar,	 Bennett,	 &	 Sekuler,	 2010;	 Richler,	 Cheung,	&	Gauthier,	 2011a;	Wang	et	al.,	2012).	
                                                1	In	this	paper	we	use	face	recognition	as	a	general	term	for	the	ability	to	process	the	identity	of	faces.	Face	recognition	has	at	least	a	perceptual	component	(that	allows	us	to	discriminate	between	two	faces)	and	a	memory	component	(responsible	for	matching	a	current	face	representation	with	a	previously	stored	representation).	We	call	these	components	face	perception	and	face	memory.	
 5 	 The	goal	of	the	present	study	was	to	test	the	assumptions	that	inversion,	composite,	and	part-whole	effects	reflect	common	underlying	mechanisms	and	that	these	effects	are	indicative	of	face	recognition	ability.	To	do	so	we	ask	whether	and	to	what	extent	these	effects	associate	across	individual	variations	in	the	normal	range.	Several	studies	(DeGutis	et	al.,	2013;	Konar	et	al.,	2010;	Richler	et	al.,	2011a;	Wang	et	al.,	2012)	have	taken	a	similar	approach	to	examine	one	or	the	other	assumption,	but	a	series	of	limitations	and	inconsistent	methods	left	the	status	of	these	questions	unclear.	First,	none	of	these	studies	tested	inversion,	part-whole	and	composite	effects	in	the	same	group	of	participants,	preventing	a	direct	comparison	of	the	extent	to	which	each	effect	is	related	to	each	other	and	to	face	recognition.	Second,	with	the	exception	of	DeGutis	et	 al.	 (2013),	 the	 researchers	 used	 subtraction	 to	 compute	 the	 effects.	 An	 example	 of	subtraction	 is	 when	 the	 part-whole	 effect	 is	 computed	 as	 the	 difference	 in	 performance	between	 parts	 presented	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	whole	 face	 (“whole”	 condition)	 versus	 parts	presented	 in	 isolation	 (“parts”	 condition).	 In	 individual	 differences	 studies,	 however,	subtraction	does	not	properly	 isolate	the	effect	specific	to	the	condition	of	 interest	 from	the	control	condition.	Instead,	subtraction	produces	measures	that	correlate	with	(and	are	thereby	confounded	 with)	 the	 control	 condition.	 For	 example,	 the	 part-whole	 effect,	 computed	 via	subtraction,	may	correlate	strongly	with	performance	in	the	parts	condition,	a	condition	that	is	used	as	a	control	condition	precisely	for	its	theorized	lack	of	holistic	processing	(DeGutis	et	al,	2013).	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	accurate	to	refer	to	a	measure	that	subtracts	non-face	processing	from	face	processing	as	“face-specific”,	as	is	sometimes	done	in	individual	differences	studies	(e.g.	 Zhu	et	 al,	 2010;	Wang	et	 al.,	 2012).	Third,	 some	 results	were	 inconsistent.	Wang	et	 al.	(2012)	 reported	 face	 recognition	 (when	 computed	 as	 a	 difference	between	 face	 and	 flower	perception,	 but	 not	 when	 reported	 as	 an	 absolute	 value)	 was	 modestly	 predicted	 by	 the	standard	composite	and	part-whole	effects	(r	=	.13	for	both),	while	the	other	studies	(DeGutis	et	al.,	2013;	Konar	et	al.,	2010;	Richler	et	al.,	2011a)	reported	no	such	correlations.	We	note	that	DeGutis	et	al.	(2013)	and	Richler	et	al.	(2011a)	reported	significant	correlations	between	face	recognition	 and	 the	 size	 of	 an	 alternative	 effect	 obtained	 with	 composite	 faces,	 in	 a	 test	originally	 introduced	by	Farah,	Wilson,	Drain,	&	Tanaka	 (1998)	 and	more	 recently	 used	by	Richler	 and	 colleagues	 (e.g.	 Cheung,	 Richler,	 Palmeri,	 &	 Gauthier,	 2008;	 Richler,	 Gauthier,	Wenger,	&	Palmeri,	2008;	Richler	et	al.,	2011a;	Richler,	Wong,	&	Gauthier,	2011d).	This	finding	did	 not	 replicate	 in	 two	 follow-up	 studies	 (Richler	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 2015).	 There	 has	 been	 an	extensive,	complex	debate	in	the	literature	about	the	differences	between	the	alternative	effect	
 6 and	the	classic	effect	based	on	the	standard	composite	paradigm2.	Conceptually	and	by	design,	the	alternative	composite	 test	measures	a	different	phenomenon	–	more	akin	 to	attentional	interference	 by	 incongruent	 information	 (Robbins	 &	 McKone,	 2007;	 Rossion,	 2013).	 The	alternative	design	adds	a	number	of	experimental	conditions	to	explicitly	measure	the	effect	on	congruency	between	the	correct	response	(same	or	different)	based	on	the	target	face	part	(e.g.	top	half)	 and	 the	 status	of	 the	 task-irrelevant	 face	part	 (e.g.	 same	or	different	bottom-half).	Importantly,	 this	 design	 produces	 sizable	 effects	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 visual	 stimuli,	 such	 as	inverted	 faces	 (Richler,	Mack,	 Palmeri,	 &	 Gauthier,	 2011c),	 novel	 objects	 (Gauthier	 &	 Tarr,	2002;	Gauthier,	Williams,	Tarr,	&	Tanaka,	1998;	Wong,	Palmeri,	&	Gauthier,	2009),	cars	(Bukach	et	al.,	2010;	Gauthier,	Curran,	Curby,	&	Collins,	2003)	or	words/characters	(Wong	et	al.,	2011;	Wong	et	al.,	2012),	often	comparable	to	the	effects	obtained	for	upright	faces.	Furthermore,	a	recent	 review	 of	 the	 alternative	 composite	 effect	 (Richler	 &	 Gauthier,	 2014)	 found	 no	correlation	 with	 the	 standard	 composite	 effect,	 additional	 evidence	 that	 the	 two	 effects	measure	distinct	phenomena.	Therefore,	while	definitely	interesting	in	the	general	context	of	congruency	 effects	 (just	 like	 the	 Navon	 effect,	 for	 example;	 Navon,	 1977),	 the	 alternative	composite	 design	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 kind	 of	 upright	 face-specific	 mechanisms	 we	 were	interested	in	this	paper	(for	readers	interested	in	other	examples	of	general	factors	correlating	with	face	recognition	ability,	such	as	fluid	intelligence,	short-term	memory,	lexical	knowledge	ability,	and	g,	we	recommend	a	recent	paper	by	Gicnac	et	al.,	2016).		 Our	 approach	 was	 to	 replicate	 and	 extend	 these	 studies	 by	 simultaneously	 testing	inversion,	 composite,	 and	 part-whole	 effects	 using	 reliable	 and	 valid	 perceptual	 tasks	 that	produce	 standard	 effects	 at	 the	 group	 level.	 Our	 paper	 makes	 four	 contributions	 to	 the	literature:	(A)	it	looks	at	a	broad	array	of	putative	face	holistic	processing	tests,	something	that	has	not	been	done	before;	(B)	it	uses	regression	rather	than	subtraction,	thereby	more	cleanly	isolating	 face-specific	 processing;	 (C)	 it	 uses	 reliable	 measures	 and	 it	 considers	 all	 of	 its	correlations	explicitly	 in	 terms	of	upper	bounds	set	by	 the	 reliability	of	 its	measures;	 (D)	 it	measures	face	recognition	abilities	using	a	reliable	and	well-validated	test	of	face	perception	with	minimum	memory	demands,	the	Cambridge	Face	Perception	Test	(Duchaine,	Germine,	&	Nakayama,	 2007;	 Bowles	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Because	 holistic	 processing	 is	 conceptualized	 a	perceptual	phenomenon,	a	 face	perception	 test	 is	better	 suited	 for	 capturing	potential	 links	between	holistic	processing	and	face	recognition	ability	than	a	face	memory	test.		
 
                                                
2 The key arguments of the debate can be found in Robbins & McKone (2007), Richler et al. 




 We	tested	participants	over	 the	web	and	 in	 the	 laboratory.	Our	original	web	sample	consisted	of	247	participants	from	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk,	of	which	we	excluded	45	based	on	abnormally	fast	response	times	suggesting	lack	of	engagement	with	the	task.	Our	final	web	sample	consisted	of	202	participants	(80	male)	with	mean	age	36.2	years	(SD	=	11.5).		 Our	original	lab	sample	consisted	of	84	Harvard	psychology	students,	of	which	we	had	to	exclude	four	because	of	technical	problems.	Our	final	lab	sample	consisted	of	80	participants	(34	male)	with	mean	age	20.5	years	(SD	=	2.1).		
2.2.	Procedure.	
 Participants	completed	four	experimental	tasks	that	were	presented	in	random	order.	The	first	measured	face	perception	abilities,	while	the	other	three	measured	holistic	processing.		 Cambridge	 Face	 Perception	 Test	 -	 CFPT	 (Duchaine,	 Germine,	 &	 Nakayama,	 2007;	Duchaine,	Yovel,	&	Nakayama,	2007).	In	this	test	participants	are	asked	to	sort	six	test	faces	(side	view)	according	to	how	much	they	resemble	a	target	face	(frontal	view).	Test	faces	are	created	by	morphing	the	target	face	with	six	identities,	and	selecting	the	images	with	88%,	76%,	64%,	52%,	40%	and	28%	of	the	target	face	on	the	morph	continua.	The	test	has	eight	upright	trials	and	eight	inverted	trials.	Participants	were	allowed	40	seconds	per	trial	(in	the	original	CFPT	participants	had	60	seconds	per	trial).	Following	Rezlescu,	Pitcher,	&	Duchaine	(2012),	the	 correct	 score	 is	 calculated	 as	 one	minus	 the	 percentage	 of	 total	 errors.	 Chance	 level	 is	35.6%.	The	demo	version	of	the	experiment	can	be	found	at:	testable.org/t/404cb3f. 
 Face	Matching	Test	(Rezlescu	et	al.,	2012).		In	this	test,	participants	are	asked	to	match	one	of	 three	 test	 faces	 (side	view)	with	 a	 target	 face	 (frontal	 view)	 in	 terms	of	 identity.	All	stimuli	are	grayscale	male	faces	with	a	standard	black	cap	to	cover	the	hair.	Participants	first	see	the	target	face	for	400ms,	followed	immediately	by	the	three	simultaneously	presented	test	images	for	2000ms,	and	have	unlimited	time	to	select	a	response.	The	chance	level	is	33.3%	and	the	test	has	60	upright	trials	and	60	inverted	trials	(randomized	presentation).	The	inversion	effect	 was	 computed	 considering	 the	 performance	 on	 upright	 and	 inverted	 trials	 using	subtraction	and	 regression	 (see	 section	2.3.	Data	 analysis).	The	demo	version	 can	be	 found	here:	testable.org/t/4b3e988. 
 Part-Whole	 Test	 (DeGutis	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Tanaka,	 Kiefer,	 &	 Bukach,	 2004).	 This	 test	presented	trials	consisting	of	one	target	image	of	a	whole	face	and	two	test	images:	either	two	whole	 faces	 (“whole”	 trials)	or	 two	 isolated	 features	 (“part”	 trials).	The	 target	appeared	 for	
 8 1000ms,	followed	by	a	mask	(scrambled	face)	for	500ms,	and	the	test	images	until	participants	indicated	which	of	the	test	stimuli	matched	the	target.		Chance	level	was	50%.	The	stimuli	were	created	from	two	Caucasian	face	templates	(one	male).	For	each	template,	six	target	faces	were	created	by	adding	distinct	noses,	mouths,	and	eyes.	Target	faces	were	unique	and	did	not	share	any	feature	between	them.	Whole	foils	for	each	target	face	were	created	by	switching	one	of	the	distinct	 features	 (eyes,	nose,	 or	mouth)	with	 that	of	 a	different	 target	 face.	The	 test	had	72	upright	“whole”	trials	and	72	upright	“part”	trials	(24	per	feature),	with	an	equal	number	of	male	and	female	targets.	The	same	trials	were	also	presented	with	the	stimuli	upside-down,	for	a	total	of	288	randomly	intermixed	trials.	The	part-whole	effects	were	calculated	considering	the	“whole”	and	“part”	trials	using	subtraction	and	regression	(see	section	2.3.	Data	analysis).	The	demo	version	can	be	found	here:	testable.org/t/45132d6.	
 Face	Composite	Test	(adapted	from	Susilo	et	al.,	2013).	Face	composites	were	created	by	combining	the	top	(i.e.	forehead)	and	bottom	(i.e.	mouth)	halves	from	60	faces	(32	female)	with	similar	skin	tone	and	neutral	expressions.	Each	composite	face	had	two	versions:	one	aligned,	in	which	the	top	and	bottom	halves	were	perfectly	aligned	to	fit	a	standard	face	template,	and	one	misaligned	in	which	the	bottom	half	was	shifted	to	the	left	or	to	the	right	by	half	the	face	width.	One	trial	consisted	of	two	composite	faces,	both	aligned	or	both	misaligned,	presented	sequentially	 (the	 first	 composite	 for	 200ms,	 a	 blank	 screen	 for	 400ms,	 and	 the	 second	composite	for	200ms).	Participants	were	asked	to	ignore	the	mouth	halves	and	say	whether	the	forehead	halves	of	the	two	composites	are	the	same	or	different.	The	mouth	halves	were	always	different.	The	 test	had	90	upright	 trials:	30	same-aligned,	30	same-misaligned,	15	different-aligned	 and	 15	 different-misaligned.	 The	 same	 trials	 were	 also	 presented	 with	 the	 stimuli	upside-down,	 for	 an	 additional	 90	 inverted	 trials.	 All	 180	 trials	 were	 randomized.	 The	composite	 effects	were	 calculated	 considering	 the	 same-aligned	 and	 same-misaligned	 trials	using	 subtraction	 and	 regression	 (see	 section	 2.3.	 Data	 analysis).	 The	 different-aligned	 and	different-misaligned	trials	were	ignored	(they	were	filler	trials).	This	is	the	standard	version	of	the	composite	test.	The	demo	version	can	be	found	here:	testable.org/t/44c14e3. 
 
2.3.	Main	measures	of	face	perception	and	holistic	processing	
 Our	main	measure	of	 face	perception	was	 the	 score	 for	 the	upright	 condition	 in	 the	CFPT.		 Holistic	processing	was	measured	by	the	inversion,	part-whole,	and	composite	effects.	Each	of	these	effects	has	a	control	(or	baseline)	condition	and	a	condition	of	interest,	and	the	effect	is	computed	by	comparing	the	two.	In	contrast	to	previous	individual	differences	studies	that	computed	these	effects	by	subtracting	the	score	in	the	control	condition	from	the	score	in	
 9 the	condition	of	interest,	we	computed	these	effects	by	regressing	the	control	condition	from	the	condition	of	interest	to	more	cleanly	isolate	face-specific	processing	(DeGutis	et	al.,	2013).	In	this	case,	the	individual	effects	are	the	residuals	from	the	regressions.	Specifically,	here	is	how	we	applied	regression	to	our	measures	of	holistic	processing:	i)	for	the	inversion	effect,	we	regressed	out	the	score	in	the	inverted	condition	from	the	score	in	the	upright	condition	in	the	Face	Matching	Test;	ii)	for	the	part-whole	effect,	we	regressed	out	the	score	in	the	part	upright	condition	 from	 the	 score	 in	 the	whole	upright	 condition	 in	 the	Part-Whole	Test;	 iii)	 for	 the	composite	effect,	we	regressed	out	the	score	in	the	same-misaligned	upright	condition	from	the	score	in	the	same-aligned	upright	condition	in	the	Face	Composite	Test.		
2.4.	Additional	measures	of	face	perception	and	holistic	processing			 To	ensure	 the	robustness	of	our	 findings,	we	considered	additional	measures	of	 face	perception	and	holistic	processing.	The	analysis	associated	with	these	additional	measures	is	presented	as	Supplemental	Material	and	reveals	similar	results	to	the	ones	reported	in	the	main	text.		 For	face	perception	abilities,	an	additional	measure	was	the	upright	score	in	the	Face	Matching	Test.	For	the	inversion	effect,	an	additional	measure	was	computed	considering	the	upright	and	inverted	scores	in	the	CFPT.		 For	the	composite	and	part-whole	effects,	we	also	computed	the	upright-specific	effects	by	regressing	out	the	effects	obtained	for	the	inverted	trials	from	the	effects	obtained	for	the	upright	trials	(our	main	measures).		 For	all	measures,	for	completion	we	also	computed	the	effects	using	subtraction	instead	of	regression	(with	the	caveat	mentioned	earlier,	 that	subtraction-based	measures	correlate	with	 the	 control	 condition,	 and	 therefore	 do	 not	 represent	 “specific”	 effects	 of	 interest	 in	individual	differences	studies).	
 






 We	 took	 several	 steps	 to	 ensure	 our	 tests	 are	 valid	 for	 an	 individual	 differences	investigation.			 First,	we	computed	the	internal	reliability	of	the	four	tests	as	measured	using	Guttman’s	
λ2	(Table	1)	and	Cronbach’s	α	(Supplemental	materials).	The	reliabilities	were	good,	ranging	between	.61	and	.83	for	the	upright	conditions.	Lower	reliabilities	are	to	be	expected	for	the	inverted	 conditions	 because	 the	 means	 are	 generally	 closer	 to	 the	 chance	 level,	 therefore	restricting	score	variance.	Our	web	and	lab	samples	produced	very	similar	reliabilities	for	all	tests	(except	the	inverted	part	condition	in	the	part-whole	test).		 Second,	we	examined	overall	performance	at	the	group	level	(Table	1).	The	conditions	in	all	four	tests	had	scores	in	line	with	previous	studies	(CFPT	and/or	inversion	effects:	Bowles	et	 al.,	 2009;	 Duchaine,	 Germine, &	 Nakayama,	 2007;	 Duchaine,	 Yovel,	 &	 Nakayama,	 2007;	Rezlescu	et	al.,	2012;	composite	and/or	part-whole	effects:	DeGutis	et	al.,	2013;	Susilo	et	al.,	2013;	Wang	et	al.,	2012),	and	the	means	and	standard	deviations	for	CFPT	and	Face	Matching	ensured	measurements	of	face	recognition	abilities	were	not	affected	by	ceiling	or	floor	effects.			 Third,	we	obtained	all	holistic	effects	at	the	group	level	(composite	effect:	27%	in	the	web	sample	and	24%	in	the	lab	sample;	part-whole	effect:	9%	in	the	web	sample	and	7%	in	the	lab	sample;	inversion	effects:	19%	for	CFPT	web	and	20%	for	CFPT	lab;	27%	for	Face	Matching	web	and	28%	for	Face	Matching	lab;	all	scores	computed	by	subtraction).			 Finally,	 we	 confirmed	 our	 experimental	 design	 was	 appropriate	 to	 reveal	 potential	correlations.	 In	 theory,	 this	 was	 ensured	 by	 the	 good	 reliabilities	 of	 the	 measures	 to	 be	correlated.	A	threshold	for	the	maximum	possible	correlation	between	two	measures	can	be	computed	as	the	geometric	mean	of	their	reliabilities,	and	higher	reliabilities	leave	more	room	to	find	existing	correlations.	We	indicate	this	maximum	threshold	for	all	reported	correlations	(the	grey	bars	 in	Figures	1	and	2).	 In	practice,	 the	substantial	correlation	(r	=	 .52,	p	<	 .001)	between	 our	 measures	 of	 face	 perception	 abilities	 –	 CFPT	 and	 Face	 Matching	 upright	 –	demonstrates	 that	 our	 study	 can	 reveal	 common	 mechanisms	 underlying	 different	 test	performance.		 Based	on	the	very	similar	reliabilities	and	overall	results	in	the	web	and	lab	samples,	we	combined	 the	 two	 samples	 in	 order	 to	 further	 increase	 the	 power	 to	 detect	 meaningful	correlations.	The	results	reported	 from	here	on	assume	a	single	sample	of	282	participants.	Separate	analyses	 for	web	and	 lab	participants	revealed	similar	results	and	are	available	as	supplementary	material.			
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3.2.	Correlations	between	holistic	measures.	










	 Our	study	has	two	major	findings.	First,	while	the	inversion	and	part-whole	effects	were	modestly	 correlated,	 the	 composite	 effect	 did	 not	 correlate	 with	 either.	 Second,	 the	 three	measures	showed	varied	relationships	with	face	recognition:	face	recognition	was	moderately	predicted	by	the	inversion	effect,	weakly	predicted	by	the	part-whole	effect,	and	not	predicted	by	the	composite	effect.		
	
4.2.	The	composite,	part-whole	and	inversion	effects	reflect	distinct	(holistic?)	mechanisms.	
	 One	question	 examined	 in	 this	 study	was	whether	 the	 various	 putative	measures	 of	holistic	processing	tap	the	same	perceptual	mechanisms.	The	widespread	assumption	in	the	
 13 face	 perception	 literature	 is	 that	 they	 do.	 Many	 review	 articles	 consider	 the	 inversion,	composite,	 and	 part-whole	 effects	 different	 ways	 to	 measure	 the	 same	 phenomenon	(Behrmann,	Richler,	Avidan,	&	Kimchi,	in	press;	Duchaine	&	Yovel,	2008;	McKone	et	al.,	2007;	Piepers	&	Robbins,	2012;	Rhodes,	2013;	Tanaka	&	Gordon,	2011).	Indeed,	studies	that	use	one	measure	often	draw	conclusions	about	holistic	processing	 in	general	 (e.g.	Avidan,	Tanzer,	&	Behrmann,	2011;	Palermo	et	al.,	2011;	Susilo	et	al.,	2010;	Pellicano	&	Rhodes,	2003;	Konar	et	al.,	2010;	Richler	et	al.,	2011a).			 Our	 results	 show	 that	 there	 is	no	 common	mechanism	explaining	 the	 three	putative	effects	of	holistic	processing.	The	results	 involving	 the	composite	effect	are	especially	clear:	zero	correlation	with	the	part-whole	effect	and	zero	correlation	with	the	inversion	effect.	The	lack	of	correlation	between	the	composite	effect	and	the	part-whole	effect	is	broadly	consistent	with	previous	studies	(Wang	et	al.,	2012;	DeGutis	et	al.,	2013	–	note	that	this	study	reported	a	correlation	between	the	part-whole	effect	and	the	alternative	composite	effect,	but	not	with	the	standard	composite	effect).			 The	composite	and	part-whole	effects	are	the	most	widely	used	direct	measures	of	a,	presumably,	unique	construct	-	holistic	processing.	Both	effects	are	similar	in	that	they	rely	on	a	difference	in	performance	between	a	condition	in	which	a	complete,	normal	face	is	present	and	a	condition	in	which	there	is	no	face	or	the	face	is	anomalous	(with	the	top	and	bottom	halves	 misaligned).	 But	 they	 also	 differ	 in	 notable	 ways,	 which	 makes	 them	 less	 likely	 to	measure	the	same	phenomenon.	First,	the	part-whole	effect	is	driven	by	increased	accuracy	in	the	whole	(normal	face)	condition,	while	the	composite	effect	relies	on	increased	errors	in	the	aligned	 (normal	 face)	 condition.	 Second,	 the	 whole	 condition	 in	 the	 part-whole	 effect	 is	essentially	a	face	identification	(matching)	task,	while	the	composite	effect	does	not	have	such	a	component	(the	whole	faces	in	each	trial	are	always	different).	Third,	in	the	part-whole	task	participants	may	use	two	strategies	to	respond	correctly,	that	is	by	observing	a	match	between	the	 correct	 test	 stimulus	and	 the	 target,	 or	by	observing	a	mismatch	between	 the	 incorrect	stimulus	 and	 the	 target	 (another	 strategy	 is	 to	 completely	 ignore	 one	 stimulus).	 In	 the	composite	 test	 however,	 attention	 to	 both	 stimuli	 is	 required	 and	 a	 single	 same/different	judgment	is	possible.	Fourth,	the	part-whole	effect	may	also	reflect	a	memory	component	in	addition	to	the	perceptual	one,	because	each	target	is	presented	twelve	times.	These	differences	may	 explain	 the	 null	 correlation	 between	 the	 composite	 and	 part-whole	 effects	 and	 why,	although	they	are	proposed	to	tap	the	same	mechanisms,	the	composite	and	part-whole	effects	are	in	fact	measures	of	distinct	phenomena.	
 14 	 The	lack	of	correlations	between	the	composite	and	the	inversion	effects	may	be	hastily	interpreted	 to	 suggest	 the	mechanisms	 behind	 the	 composite	 effect	 are	 not	 specific	 to	 the	upright	faces.	After	all,	the	inversion	effects,	by	definition	(regressing	out	the	inverted	from	the	upright	performance),	should	capture	all	mechanisms	that	operate	on	upright	but	not	inverted	faces.	Therefore,	the	inversion	effects	should	correlate	with	other	upright-specific	mechanisms.	This	reasoning	 is	valid	under	one	condition:	 if	we	assume	that	 the	 inversion	and	composite	effects	 both	 measure	 the	 efficiency	 of	 face-specific	 mechanisms.	 However,	 we	 believe	 the	composite	effect	 is	not	a	measure	of	efficiency,	but	a	hallmark	of	certain	type	of	 information	entering	face	computations.	This	idea,	consistent	with	the	much	larger	composite	effect	found	for	upright	faces	than	for	inverted	faces,	is	explored	more	in	the	following	section.				 The	part-whole	effect	and	the	inversion	effects	were	significantly	correlated,	but	the	size	of	 the	 correlations	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 they	 measure	 the	 same	 phenomenon.	 The	correlation	(r	=	.28,	adjusted	r	=	.57)	corresponds	to	a	shared	variance	of	under	8%	(or	32%	in	the	ideal	case	of	perfect	test	reliabilities).	For	comparison,	in	our	study	the	correlation	between	upright	 scores	 in	 the	 CFPT	 and	 the	 Face	 Matching	 Test,	 two	 measures	 of	 face	 perception	abilities,	was	significantly	higher	(r	=	.52,	adjusted	r	=	.72;	adjusted	explained	variance	52%). 






	 The	second	question	of	our	study	was	whether	face	perception	abilities	are	predicted	by	any	of	the	three	holistic	processing	measures.	Previous	studies	provided	mixed	evidence.	Konar	et	al.	(2010)	reported	no	significant	correlation	between	the	composite	effect	based	on	response	times	and	a	face	identification	task.	In	contrast,	Wang	et	al.	(2012)	found	that	a	face-matching	test	showed	a	small	correlation	with	both	the	standard	composite	and	the	part-whole	effect	(although	the	primary	analyses	in	this	study,	based	on	subtraction	scores,	did	not	isolate	face-specific	processing).	DeGutis	et	al.	(2013)	also	found	a	significant	correlation	between	face	memory	 and	 the	 part-whole	 effect,	 but	 no	 correlation	 with	 the	 standard	 composite	 effect.	Finally,	Richler	et	al.	(2011)	reported	no	correlation	between	face	recognition	and	the	standard	composite	effect3.	In	short,	there	is	insufficient	evidence	in	the	literature	regarding	the	relation	between	direct	and	face-specific	measures	of	holistic	processing	and	face	perception	abilities.	Furthermore,	the	relation	with	the	indirect	measure	of	holistic	processing	(the	inversion	effect)	has	not	been	investigated.			 In	our	study,	of	all	the	effects	purported	to	measure	holistic	processing,	the	inversion	effect	had	the	highest	correlation	with	face	perception	abilities,	evidence	that	our	remarkable	ability	to	recognize	faces	is	dependent	on	perceptual	mechanisms	engaged	by	upright	but	not	inverted	faces.	This	is	at	odds	with	a	previous	claim	by	Sekuler,	Gaspar,	Gold,	&	Bennett	(2004)	that	“upright	and	inverted	face	processing	differ	quantitatively,	not	qualitatively”.	Their	claim	was	based	on	 the	unsurprising	 result	 that	when	part-based	 face	processing	 is	 enforced	 (by	varying	noise	in	different	face	regions),	participants	rely	on	similar	strategies	to	discriminate	upright	 and	 inverted	 faces.	 However,	 the	 composite	 and	 part-whole	 effects	 are	 strong	indicators	that	upright	face	perception	in	normal	conditions	(i.e.	with	the	whole	face	visible)	goes	 beyond	 individual	 parts	 processing.	 Unfortunately,	 the	 fact	 that	 inversion	 effects	 can	predict	 face	 perception	 abilities	 reveals	 little	 about	 the	 precise	 nature	 of	 the	 mechanisms	performing	face	recognition.			 The	two	direct	measures	of	holistic	processing	had	limited	(in	the	case	of	part-whole)	or	 no	 (for	 composite)	 power	 to	 predict	 face	 recognition.	 Our	 results	 add	 to	 the	 evidence	suggesting	that,	at	least	for	a	normal	population,	increased	holistic	processing	as	indexed	by	these	effects	does	not	correspond	to	better	face	recognition.	This	may	appear	at	odds	with	the	posited	necessary	role	of	holistic	processing	in	normal	face	perception	(e.g.	Busigny	et	al.,	2010;	
                                                
3 DeGutis et al. (2013) and Richler et al. (2011) reported a correlation between face recognition and 
an alternative composite effect (see Introduction for differences in the phenomena measured by the 
standard versus alternative composite effects).  
 16 Levine	&	 Calvanio,	 1989;	 Palermo	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Ramon	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Tanzer,	 Freud,	 Ganel,	&	Avidan,	 2013).	There	 are	 two	possibilities.	 The	 first	 possibility	 is	 that	holistic	 processing	 is	indeed	a	hallmark	of	normal	face	mechanisms,	but	variations	within	normal	range	are	related	to	non-face	processes	(e.g.	ability	to	restrict	one’s	attention	to	the	top	half	of	an	image).	The	second	possibility	is	that	mechanisms	underlying	face	holistic	processing	are	not	needed	for	successful	 face	 identification.	However,	 they	may	 share	 adjacent	 brain	 areas,	 leading	 to	 the	observed	concurrent	damage	in	many	reported	cases	of	acquired	prosopagnosia.			 We	favor	the	first	possibility.	The	composite	and	part-whole	effect	seem	to	reflect	the	operation	of	face-specific	mechanisms,	but	not	the	efficiency	of	these	mechanisms.	How	can	this	be?	We	can	draw	an	analogy	with	other	visual	illusions,	such	as	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	(Müller-Lyer,	1889).	This	illusion	illustrates	that	perception	of	a	line	length	depends	on	the	orientation	of	the	arrows	at	both	ends,	but	does	not	say	anything	about	how	efficient	a	visual	system	is.	In	other	words,	it	reveals	the	type	of	information	entering	computation,	or	maybe	a	method	for	computation,	but	not	how	efficient	 the	computations	are.	Similarly,	 the	composite	and	part-whole	effect	seem	to	reflect	a	type	of	information	(or	method)	that	is	critical	for	successful	face	recognition	(if	that	information	or	method	are	not	available,	computations	cannot	proceed),	but	not	how	efficiently	the	face	mechanisms	process	that	information.			 The	null	 correlation	between	 the	 composite	 effect	 and	 face	 recognition	 is	 consistent	with	 most	 previous	 studies	 except	 Wang	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 and	 in	 that	 study	 the	 significant	correlation	between	the	two	measures	was	very	small	(r	=	.13).	There	are	also	a	few	aspects	of	the	Wang	et	al.	(2012)	study	that	may	explain	the	different	results.	First,	the	authors	computed	the	composite	effect	using	both	“same”	and	“different”	trials,	whereas	we,	following	standard	practice	 (Rossion,	 2013),	 only	 used	 “same”	 trials	 (no	 perceptual	 illusion	 is	 expected	 in	 the	“different”	 trials).	 Second,	 the	 correlation	was	obtained	only	when	 they	used	 the	difference	score	 between	 face	 and	 flower	 recognition,	 not	when	 they	used	 the	 absolute	 score	 for	 face	recognition.	Third,	the	presentation	times	were	different	from	our	study	(800ms	for	the	first	stimulus	and	500ms	for	 the	second	stimulus,	compared	to	200ms	and	200ms	 in	our	study).	Presentation	times	longer	than	150-200ms	allow	for	multiple	saccades	and	thus	may	increase	the	probability	of	a	feature-matching	strategy	from	participants.	 
 
4.4.	Is	the	composite	effect	simply	an	invalid	measure?	
	 	The	composite	effect	in	our	study	had	essentially	null	correlations	with	the	inversion	effect,	the	part-whole	effect	and	CFPT.	This	raises	the	possibility	that	there	may	be	something	peculiar	 (methodologically	 and/or	 conceptually)	 about	 the	 composite	 test	 we	 used,	 a	possibility	 that	 would	 preclude	 us	 from	 drawing	 strong	 inferences	 from	 the	 current	 data.	
 17 However,	we	believe	this	is	not	the	case.	First,	the	face	composite	test	produced	group	effects	very	similar	to	those	reported	in	previous	studies	(Busigny	et	al.,	2010;	Jiang,	Blanz,	&	Rossion,	2011;	Rossion,	2013;	Susilo	et	al.,	2013).	Second,	the	composite	test	had	good	internal	reliability	(higher	 than	 the	 internal	 reliabilities	 of	 the	 other	 tests	we	 used),	making	 it	 an	 appropriate	measure	to	use	in	individual	differences	studies.	Third,	the	composite	illusion	seems	the	most	straightforward	way	to	capture	at	least	one	interpretation	of	holistic	processing,	according	to	which	 parts	 cannot	 be	 represented	 independently	 of	 other	 parts	 (Rossion,	 2008).	 The	composite	effect	is	a	direct	measure	of	the	differences	in	the	representation	of	the	same	face	part	 when	 other	 face	 parts	 change.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 part-whole	 effect	 contrasts	 the	representations	of	a	face	part	in	isolation	versus	in	the	face	context,	while	the	inversion	effect	does	not	tell	us	much	about	what	is	measured.		 However,	 the	 composite	 test	may	 be	 criticized	 on	 two	 fronts.	 Methodologically,	 the	composite	effect	is	prone	to	ceiling	effects,	especially	in	the	misaligned	condition.	In	this	case,	a	 difference	 in	 performance	 between	 the	 misaligned	 and	 aligned	 trials	 would	 reveal	 the	
existence	 of	 perceptual	 mechanisms	 engaged	 solely	 by	 aligned	 faces,	 but	 would	 not	 be	 a	sensitive	quantitative	measure	of	the	effects	of	these	mechanisms.	For	example,	good	top-face	recognizers	 may	 show	 less	 of	 a	 composite	 effect	 because	 their	 at-ceiling	 scores	 in	 the	misaligned	condition	do	not	reflect	their	true	abilities.	This	reduced	sensitivity	to	 individual	differences	in	the	misaligned	condition	may	in	principle	affect	the	(lack	of)	correlations	with	the	other	measures.	However,	that	was	not	the	case	in	our	study.	Excluding	the	participants	who	 were	 at	 ceiling	 in	 the	 misaligned	 condition	 did	 not	 modify	 our	 findings.	 Similarly,	considering	the	response	times	instead	of	accuracy	scores	(an	option	used	by	some	researchers	to	avoid	ceiling	effects)	produced	very	similar	results.			 A	group	of	researchers	(e.g.	Richler	et	al.,	2011a,	2011b,	2011c,	2011d)	has	argued	that	the	standard	composite	design	is	invalid	because	it	fails	to	correct	for	“response	bias”.	In	their	view,	the	standard	composite	effect	is	driven	by	a	change	in	decision	bias	in	the	aligned	versus	misaligned	 condition,	with	participants	more	 likely	 to	 select	 the	 “different”	 response	 in	 the	aligned	 condition.	 However,	 this	 group	 of	 researchers	 failed	 to	 provide	 a	 conceivable	mechanism	to	explain	the	relevant	results:	how	can	a	decision	bias	manifest	 itself	only	with	upright	aligned	faces	but	not	with	upright	misaligned	or	with	inverted	aligned	and	misaligned	faces?	 In	 contrast,	 the	 standard	 composite	design	 is	based	on	a	 clear	 theoretical	 account	 to	explain	the	results	in	all	conditions:	the	upright	faces	engage	perceptual	mechanisms	that	are	not	 engaged	by	 stimuli	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 a	 standard	 face	 template	 (i.e.	 inverted	 or	misaligned	faces).	Any	non-perceptual	component	in	the	standard	composite	effect	is	controlled	for	by	the	
 18 use	of	 inverted	and	misaligned	conditions.	 In	addition,	 the	 composite	effect	 in	 the	 standard	design	 can	 also	 be	 computed	 based	 on	 response	 times	 (instead	 of	 the	 same/different	responses)	in	the	aligned	versus	misaligned	“same”	conditions.	This	measure	is	free	of	response	bias	 criticisms.	 In	 our	 study,	 the	 composite	 effect	 based	on	 response	 times	 to	 correct	 trials	produced	the	same	findings	(i.e.	lack	of	correlations	with	the	other	measures)	as	the	composite	effect	 based	 on	 same/different	 responses.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 we	 find	 the	 criticism	 about	response	bias	in	the	standard	composite	design	does	not	affect	our	findings.	We	also	note	that	the	suggested	alternative	to	the	standard	composite	test	measures	congurency	effects	which	are	not	face-specific	(as	opposed	to	a	face-based	visual	illusion)	and	so	would	not	have	been	appropriate	for	this	study	(see	Introduction	for	details).		 Conceptually,	 the	expectation	 that	 the	 composite	 effect	 is	 a	 sensitive	measure	of	 the	efficiency	 of	 face-specific	mechanisms	 leads	 to	 a	 paradox.	 On	 one	 hand,	more	 efficient	 face	mechanisms	 translate	 into	 superior	 face	 recognition.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 size	 of	 the	composite	effect	depends	mostly	on	the	number	of	errors	in	the	aligned	condition	(more	errors,	larger	effect).	However,	it	seems	unintuitive	to	expect	better	face	recognizers	to	perform	worse	(i.e.	large	composite	effect)	in	a	face	perception	test,	regardless	of	the	test.	If	we	take	an	ideal	(i.e.	 flawless)	 face	 recognizer,	would	we	 expect	 her	 to	make	 the	most	 errors	 in	 the	 aligned	condition?	Probably	not,	and	one	could	reasonably	argue	the	opposite.	Instead,	this	observation	is	 consistent	with	 the	 interpretation	of	 the	 composite	 illusion	 as	 a	hallmark	of	 face-specific	information	processing,	but	not	as	a	measure	of	the	efficiency	of	face	perception	mechanisms.			
 
4.5.	Final	considerations	
	 In	this	paper	we	considered	the	common-held	belief	that	the	inversion,	composite	and	part-whole	effects	reflect	in	one	way	or	another	holistic	processing.	As	we	have	seen,	there	is	compelling	evidence	to	reject	this	simplistic	view.	Perhaps	the	fundamental	problem	is	in	trying	to	 measure	 holistic	 processing	 before	 having	 a	 coherent	 theoretical	 definition	 of	 holistic	processing.	Despite	a	few	attempts	to	define	it	(Galton,	1883;	Maurer,	Grand,	&	Mondloch,	2002;	Rossion,	2008,	2009;	Tanaka	&	Farah,	1993),	it	is	not	clear	what	face	holistic	processing	is,	how	it	 can	be	computationally	 implemented	(but	see	Xu,	Biederman,	&	Shah,	2014),	or	how	 it	 is	different	from	the	Gestalt-like	definition	of	the	emergent	properties	of	a	whole	(Pomerantz	&	Portillo,	2011).	Future	research	should	aim	to	more	precisely	answer	 these	questions.	Until	then,	and	until	compelling	evidence	that	any	of	the	three	measures	used	in	this	study	measures	holistic	processing,	we	advocate	the	use	of	the	name	of	each	effect	(i.e.	composite,	part-whole,	inversion)	over	the	use	of	the	term	“holistic	processing”. 
 19 
 Another	question	is	whether	the	various	mechanisms	leading	to	the	three	effects,	as	we	have	seen	mostly	at	play	for	upright	faces,	contribute	to	face	detection.		It	is	conceivable	that	the	 ability	 to	 instantly	 integrate	 information	 from	multiple	 face	parts	 and	produce	 a	whole	representation	 “bigger	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 parts”	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 face	 detection.	Admittedly,	 this	 would	 be	 at	 odds	 with	 evidence	 from	 neuropsychology:	 acquired	prosopagnosics	 typically	do	not	have	difficulties	with	 face	detection	(Bruyer	et	al.,	1983;	de	Gelder	&	Rouw,	2000;	Rossion	et	al.,	2003;	Schiltz	et	al.,	2006)	despite	reported	cases	of	absent	or	 reduced	 inversion	 (Boutsen	 &	 Humphreys,	 2002;	 Busigny	 &	 Rossion,	 2009;	 McNeil	 &	Warrington,	 1991;	 Rezlescu	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 reduced	 composite	 and/or	 part-whole	 effects	(Busigny	et	al.,	2010;	Delvenne,	Seron,	Coyette,	&	Rossion,	2004;	Ramon	et	al.,	2010).	However,	creating	 sensitive	 face	 detection	 tests	 is	 challenging,	 so	 subtle	 impairments	may	have	 been	overlooked	due	to	ceiling	effects.	In	fact,	with	rigorous	psychophysical	testing,	a	large	number	of	 developmental	 prosopagnosics	 showed	 difficulties	 on	 face	 detection	 tasks	 (Garrido,	Duchaine,	 &	 Nakayama,	 2008)	 and	 a	 first	 case	 of	 impaired	 face	 detection	 in	 acquired	prosopagnosia	has	recently	been	reported	(Xu	&	Biederman,	2014).		 Finally,	another	thing	to	consider	is	whether	the	inversion,	composite	and	part-whole	effects	tap	mechanisms	specific	to	upright	faces.	There	is	considerable	evidence	that	inversion	produces	a	disproportionately	larger	effect	in	faces	than	non-face	objects,	but	a	small	inversion	effect	is	sometimes	found	with	non-face	objects.	The	evidence	is	more	mixed	when	it	comes	to	the	composite	and	part-whole	effects.	The	reduced	(or	 lack	of)	effects	with	non-face	objects	may	be	due	to	stimuli	confounds.	Most	non-face	stimuli	are	rigid	objects	that	can	be	reliably	identified	by	parts.	Their	parts	typically	do	not	change	shape	and	have	constant	spatial	relations	among	them,	 therefore	 identification	of	a	single	difference	between	two	objects	 is	a	reliable	indication	 they	 are	 different.	 When	 non-face	 stimuli	 are	 parametrically	 manipulated	 (e.g.	Busigny	et	al.,	2010),	the	changes	follow	predictable	paths,	the	stimuli	are	clearly	artificial	and	the	smallest	detectable	difference	leads	again	to	perception	of	two	distinct	objects	because	of	expected	rigidness.	For	biological	stimuli	(e.g.	bodies)	that	have	non-rigid	parts	with	varying	distances	 between	 them,	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 differences	 between	 two	 objects	 is	 usually	much	higher	 than	 for	 faces.	 Definitive	 conclusions	 about	 the	 specificity	 of	 presumed	 face-specific	behavioral	effects	can	be	drawn	only	by	comparison	of	faces	to	natural,	non-face	looking	objects	matched	to	faces	in	terms	of	scope,	magnitude	and	plausibility	of	part	changes.			 If	the	inversion,	composite	and	part-whole	effects	are	not	specific	to	upright	faces,	they	may	reflect	more	general	Gestalt	processing	mechanisms,	of	the	type	measured	in	visual	closure	tests	(Street,	1931)	or	in	the	Navon	task	(Navon,	1977).	Even	if	that	was	the	case,	it	is	highly	










Figure	1.	Correlations	between	the	three	measures	of	holistic	processing.	The	grey	bars	represent	the	maximum	 possible	 correlation	 considering	 test	 reliabilities.	 Significant	 correlations	 (p<.05)	 are	 in	green,	nonsignificant	correlations	are	in	red.	The	triangle	in	the	middle	shows	the	significant	differences	between	correlations.	n.s.	=	not	significant.		
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